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In order to analyse the role of competition in the post-trade markets a normative 
network economic analysis of the securities business is provided. The theory of 
monopolistic bottlenecks constitutes the theoretical reference point for this 
analysis in order to identify stable network specific market power. It is shown 
that clearing and settlement are competitive value-added telecommunications 
services and therefore do not justify ex ante market power regulation. Precondi-
tion for competition on the markets for clearing and settlement is non-
discriminatory access to the complementary technical regulatory function – the 
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1.     Introduction 
 
The controversy surrounding the competitiveness of post-trade markets in the 
securities business is currently on top of the agenda to achieve an integrated 
European capital market. In that respect traditional network sectors are increas-
ingly being referred to. The European Financial Service Round Table (2003, 
p.2) maintains, for example, that clearing and settlement service providers are 
infrastructures that have the characteristics of a natural monopoly. As a result, 
access to clearing and settlement facilities would require regulation. In this con-
text, post-trade services are compared to railways, airports, and telecommunica-
tions infrastructures in particular.
1 As a consequence, post-trade services would 
demand far-reaching regulatory measures similar to those established in the tele-
communications, energy or railway sectors. These measures include, for exam-
ple, provisions guaranteeing open network access at regulated tariffs, discussion 
of the need for vertical unbundling, provisions on unbundled network access etc. 
The matter of whether or not comprehensive rights of access and choice should 
be guaranteed at every level of the trading and settlement chain by means of EC 
regulations is also a subject of controversial discussion with regard to post-trade 
services.
2 The current debate surrounding the introduction of regulatory meas-
ures on the markets for clearing and settlement draws parallels to the traditional 
network sectors.  
 
The hypothesis that clearing and settlement as a whole constitutes a network in-
frastructure in need of regulation is based on the assumption that clearing and 
settlement represents an essential facility. As a basic infrastructure this would 
have to be separated from all other commercial activities in the financial and 
                                                 
1  “Clearing and settlement infrastructures benefit from a natural monopoly – granted 
de facto, if not by law.... As a result, access to these infrastructures is compulsory for 
financial intermediaries, who serve retail and institutional investors. Their roles can 
partly be compared to that of railway, airport or telecommunication infrastructures. 
As such, they must be adequately regulated and supervised as long as the barriers to 
competition in this field are not removed.” (European Financial Services Round Ta-
ble, 2003, p. 2). 
2   Cf. Commission of the European Community, Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament, Clearing and Settlement in the European 
Union, – The way forward, COM (2004) 312 final, Brussels, 28.4.2004.   2  
stock exchange sector.
3 In order to evaluate these types of hypotheses the appli-
cation of network economics is essential for thoroughly examining the potential 
for competition on the post-trade markets. A normative analysis, of whether or 
not a need for regulation of stable network-specific market power can be estab-
lished in the post-trade markets’ value chain is of key significance. Depending 
on its findings, cost allocation and pricing decisions on the markets for clearing 
and settlement should be left to the flexibility of market participants (within the 
framework of general competition law), or, alternatively, sector-specific market 
power regulation is justified. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Based on the securities trading value chain, 
section 2 will demonstrate how the functions of clearing and settlement can be 
differentiated from the notary function, and enhanced custody services. Section 
3 starts with an explanation of the theory of monopolistic bottlenecks, which can 
be used as a basis for distinguishing between parts of a network where competi-
tion functions efficiently and other parts with stable, network-specific market 
power. Section 4 explores the opportunities for potential and active competition 
on the post-trade markets in securities. In particular, it is shown that clearing and 
settlement are value-added telecommunications services, which means that these 
markets are competitive.  
 
Alongside the problem of regulating network-specific market power, matters of 
technical regulation are also of significance as part of this paper. Although tech-
nical regulatory functions can also have implications for competition policy, the 
latter differ fundamentally from regulatory intervention applied to discipline 
network-specific market power. In section 5, the layering scheme of network 
economics is introduced and applied to post-trade markets in securities trading. 
The technical regulatory functions in the area of the notary function are exam-
ined more closely. Building on the differentiation between technical regulatory 
                                                 
3   “The centralised organisation for securities clearing and settlement that can be found 
in most of the European countries constitutes an essential facility necessary for all 
market transactions. … These infrastructures are therefore analogous to the electric-
ity grid, gas pipelines, or telephone system but with the added factor of importance to 
the economic well-being of the EU Member States concerned.” (Citigroup, 2003, pp. 
26, 27).    3  
functions and services on different network layers, this section centres on the 
need for non-discriminatory access to these technical regulatory functions. 
 
 
2.    Characteristics of post-trade markets 
 
In order to analyze the role of competition on post-trade markets, closer ap-
praisal of the securities trading value chain is needed. 
 
 
2.1   The securities trading value chain 
 
Four consecutive stages can be identified in the securities trading value chain:  
(1)   Information stage (pre-trade phase), where investors collect information in 
order to make investment decisions.  
(2)  Order-routing stage, where securities orders within the banking system are 
placed on an over-the-counter/OTC market or a stock exchange.  
(3)  Trading stage, where securities are traded and a suitable counterparty has to 
be found. At this stage a price is set for a specific volume. Trading can take 
place with either newly issued securities (primary market) or with securi-
ties that have already been placed (secondary market). Trading can take 
place either via a stock exchange (with differing levels of automation on 
trading platforms) or within or directly between credit institutions and se-
curities service providers. 
(4)  Post-trade stage; this covers the functional elements of clearing, settlement, 
the notary function, as well as enhanced custody services (e.g. of distribu-
tion of investment income). Clearing and settlement are services that arise 
from securities trading (e.g. Giddy, Saunders, Walter, 1996, p. 987). Clear-
ing refers to the calculation of the bilateral net liabilities from the purchases 
and sales of a securities transaction. Settlement means the conclusion of a 
securities transaction, i.e. the exchange of securities against a cash counter 
value. The focus of the notary function is to maintain an issuer account as a   4  
“memorandum account” (authenticity) as well as a periodically distribution 
by issuers to the owners of the securities (registry). Downstream custody 
services cover the implementation of capital services as well as corporate 
actions (cash capital increases, exchange offers, etc.). 
 
It is important to differentiate between activities on the trading stage and activi-
ties on the post trade stage. Central counterparties (CCPs) belong to the trading 
stage. A CCP interposes itself between counterparties to financial contracts 
traded in one or more markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller 
to every buyer. Therefore, CCPs take principal risks facing in particular the 
counterparty credit risk as well as the liquidity risk. In analogy to ancillary 
banking services, capital requirements, guarantee funds and other banking regu-
lations are recommended for CCPs (Bank for International Settlements, 2004). 
Those regulations should not be confused with proper regulation of market 
power on the post-trade markets.           
 
 
2.2   Organizational and institutional alternatives to clearing and settlement 
 
The securities business is linked to numerous accounting processes that occur at 
different points in the value chain. A basic distinction has to be made between 
account movements in the settlement of securities transactions at end-customer 
level (business relationships between investors and their principal bank) and 
those at earlier stages. Furthermore, a distinction should be made between two 
different types of end customer within the securities transaction value chain: the 
issuers, who distribute new securities via an underwriter and trading in securities 
that are already in circulation. 
 
There are different organizational / institutional alternatives for trading in securi-
ties; depending on this, the necessary clearing and settlement functions are car-
ried out by different market participants. These include: commercial banks (in-
tra-bank trading: over-the-counter /OTC), transaction banks, end custodians   5  
(Central Securities Depository -CSD-)
4, International Central Securities Deposi-





2.3   Distinction of clearing and settlement from the notary function 
 
The notary function has to be differentiated into authenticity and registry. Au-
thenticity means the confirmation of the authenticity of the securities holdings. 
The registry function can generally be rephrased as “keeping legal record of 
ownership of securities” (securities deposit).
6 The registry function responds the 
needs of securities issuers. In contrast to bank notes, where proof of authenticity 
is sufficient but information on the distribution to the different owners is com-
pletely irrelevant, securities generate earnings that are in general periodically 
distributed by issuers to the owners of the securities. The prerequisite in this 
case, therefore, is that issuers have access to the necessary information. 
 
Clearing and settlement on the one hand and the notary function on the other 
represent fundamentally different functions of the post-trade value chain. It is 
important to note that the notary function is not an integral component of settle-
ment. The transfer of ownership takes place within the settlement process, even 
if registration has not yet taken place or will not take place at all on the issuer’s 
account (cf. Horn, 2002, p. 11). The transfer of securities ownership from seller 
                                                 
4    This paper uses the term “end custodian”, equivalent to the term “Central Securities 
Depository” (CSD) which is more common in general use. The standard international 
term Central Securities Depository (CSD) is confusing insofar as, for example, pur-
suant to the German Safe Custody Act (Depotgesetz – DepotG), more than one 
“Wertpapiersammelbank” may operate as collective custodian, making the term end 
custodian more apt. The use of the term end custodian is advantageous, therefore, as 
it does not suggest terminologically that only one securities depository can exist; fur-
thermore, this use makes clear that it is possible to have a chain of several intermedi-
ate custodians. 
5  For more detailed explanations of the different providers and their various roles in 
clearing and settlement,  
  see e.g. Bank for International Settlement, 1995, Annex 3, pp. 46-57; Bank for Inter-
national Settlement, 2003; Kröpfl, 2003, pp. 28-32. 
6  The term “registration” is introduced in the sense of a notary function. The term 
“registration” therefore does not focus on different kinds of shares.    6  
to buyer does not require the involvement of the notary function of an end cus-
todian. The end custodian takes on the role of neither the agent of the purchaser 
nor the authorized agent of the seller.
7 
 
To the extent that a CSD provides clearing and settlement services, it operates 
on the same functional level as transactions banks or other intermediate custodi-
ans. Of key importance for settlement, however, is that every single securities 
transaction is booked on time and on a case-to-case basis.
8 There are different 
kinds of clearing and settlement services depending on the type of securities 
transaction. 
 
Transactions within collective safe custody are subject to registration when ac-
counts of securities holders of the end custodian require rebooking.
 As this re-
booking can also involve netting (i.e. the aggregation of several offsetting trans-
actions of securities account holders), it does not necessarily imply any direct 
conclusions concerning the actual changes in ownership at end-customer level. 
CSDs are particularly unable to function in an auditing capacity for all settle-
ment bookings, as in many cases they have no information concerning such ac-
count activities.  
 
 
3.    Criteria for the regulation of network-specific market power 
 
The introduction of network-specific market power regulation is only justified if 
a stable market power problem can be localized in the sectors examined. A suit-
able economic reference model that exposes the need for regulation in disciplin-
ing stable market power in the network sectors needs to be able to capture the 
essential network characteristics, without automatically equating them with 
market power. The following section establishes that stable network-specific 
                                                 
7   “Because according to the perception of market participants, declarations of intent 
are submitted and received, both in personam as well as in rem, by sellers and pur-
chasers and the banks acting on their behalf.” (Horn, 2002, p. 11; translation by the 
author). 
8   For example, these requirements are given in the provisions of the German Commer-
cial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch  - HGB, esp. section 239).   7  
market power and ensuing need for regulation can only be derived in the case of 
a monopolistic bottleneck. 
 
 
3.1   The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks 
 
The monopolistic bottleneck theory is based on a consistent implementation of 
Stigler's concept of a barrier to market entry to identify stable, network-specific 
market power.
9 Stable, network-specific market power can only be identified for 
a combination of a natural monopoly and irreversible costs. A natural monopoly 
exists if a single supplier can serve the market in question more cost-efficiently 
than several suppliers, meaning that the cost function in the relevant area of de-
mand is subadditive.
10 Reviews of the cost side of networks focus primarily on 
the bundling advantages achieved through economies of scale and economies of 
scope in service provision. These bundling advantages can imply that a single 
network operator may be able to serve a given market at a lower cost than a 
number of competing suppliers. This is termed a ‘natural monopoly’ (cf. e.g. 
Baumol, Panzar, Willig 1982; Baumol, 1977).  
 
For the incumbents, irreversible costs no longer affect decision-making. Poten-
tial entrants on the other hand have to decide whether or not to incur these irre-
versible costs in the market they wish to enter. The incumbents therefore have 
lower decision-relevant costs than the potential entrants. Irreversible costs in 
combination with a natural monopoly constitute a credible threat that may dis-
courage a second network operator from entering the market. Although even the 
                                                 
9   Stigler defines barriers to market entry as follows: “A barrier to entry may be defined 
as a cost of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a 
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the indus-
try” (Stigler, 1968, p. 67). 
   According to Stigler, production factors do not constitute barriers to market entry as 
long as they are available to both the incumbents and potential entrants on the same 
terms. Hence, economies of scale do not constitute a barrier to market entry as long 
as potential entrants have access to the same cost function. 
10  For the single-product case, economies of scale are sufficient to characterize a natu-
ral monopoly. Networks typically represent the multi-product company case. Trans-
portation between different points of the network, for example, constitutes different 
products.   8  
irreversible costs have to achieve risk-equivalent rates of return, they would be 
irrevocably lost after market entry, so the threat that the incumbent could tempo-
rarily reduce its prices down to the variable cost level is indeed credible. 
 
The conditions necessary for a monopolistic bottleneck facility are fulfilled if 
(1)     facility is necessary in order to reach customers, i.e. if there is no second or 
third such facility, in other words no active substitute is available. This is 
the case if due to bundling advantages there is a natural monopoly situa-
tion, meaning that one supplier can make available the facility more cost-
efficiently then several suppliers; 
(2)   and if at the same time the facility cannot be duplicated on reasonable eco-
nomic terms, i.e. there is no potential substitute available. This is the case if 
the costs of the facility are irreversible.  
 
This means that the established company can only be expected to have network-
specific market power in those areas that are characterized not only by bundling 
advantages and the resulting natural monopoly, but at the same time also by ir-
reversible costs. As a result, the company that holds this kind of monopolistic 
bottleneck has stable market power even if all market participants are perfectly 
informed, all consumers are prepared to switch provider, and minor price 
changes lead to a shift in demand (Knieps, 1997, pp. 327-328).  
 
In the absence of irreversible costs, bundling advantages, however, do not result 
in stable market power – even where a natural monopoly exists – due to the dis-
ciplinary effect of potential competition.
11 This applies regardless of the size of 
the market share of the network operator involved, because inefficient providers 
whose services are not market-oriented are replaced by new market entrants due 
to competitive pressure. In such cases, there is no need for regulation in order to 
discipline the market power of active network operators. 
                                                 
11  In the absence of irreversible costs, natural monopolies do not have market power 
that is capable of withstanding alternative behavioral assumptions (cf. Knieps,   
Vogelsang, 1982). Market power based on the Cournot-Nash assumption becomes 
immediately instable when the Bertrand-Nash behavioral assumption is applied. As a 
result, any intervention by regulatory authorities would have to be based on behav-
ioral hypotheses that are difficult to check empirically.    9  
Whereas the focus of the theory of contestable markets concentrates on the role 
of the potential competition with identical cost functions for both active and po-
tential competitors (cf. Baumol, 1982; Panzar, Willig, 1977), network competi-
tion does not only mean potential competition. Active network competition, 
characterized by network heterogeneity and network diversity, also may play a 
key role (Knieps, 1997, p. 333). 
 
The remaining market power in monopolistic bottleneck facilities can be suffi-
ciently disciplined by means of price cap regulation in monopolistic bottleneck 
areas and accounting separation. On the other hand, detailed input regulation 
contradicts the principle of price cap regulation.
12 Limiting the regulatory provi-
sion to the level of output prices is intended to keep information requirements by 
the regulatory authorities at a minimum. This not only reduces the regulatory 
task required, it also motivates companies to look for ways of making cost sav-
ings or implementing innovative price structures. One of the advantages of price 
cap regulation when compared with individual rate approval is that it does not 
hinder companies from seeking out innovative price structures.  
 
 
3.2   Monopolistic bottlenecks and the essential facilities concept 
 
The current debate surrounding the possible applications of general competition 
law as opposed to sector-specific regulatory provisions is reflected in the Access 
Notice at European level.
13 When rules of competition are used in order to disci-
pline network-specific market power, the idea of essential facilities plays a key 
role in the Access Notice, thus, for instance, in Section 68, Access Notice: “The 
expression essential facility is used to describe a facility or infrastructure, which 
is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors to carry on their 
business, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means.”  
 
                                                 
12  For more information on the instrument of price cap regulation the reader is referred 
to e.g. Braeutigam, Panzar, 1993. 
13  Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the tele-
communications sector – Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles 
(98/C265/02), Official Journal of the European Communities, 22. 8. 98, pp. 2-28.   10  
This provision suggests a connection with the essential facilities doctrine result-
ing from US antitrust law, which is now also being used increasingly in Euro-
pean competition law.
14 In accordance with this doctrine, a facility can only be 
regarded as essential if the following two conditions are fulfilled: (1) market  
entry to the complementary market is not actually possible without access to this 
facility, and (2) providers on the complementary market cannot, using reason-
able effort, duplicate the facility; substitutes do not exist either (see e.g. Areeda, 
Hoverkamp, 1988, 736.2). 
 
The application of the essential facilities doctrine means that a traditional in-
strument of competition law can be used as a regulatory instrument. A facility is 
regarded as essential if it fulfils the criteria for classification as a monopolistic 
bottleneck facility. The concept of an essential facility therefore provides a   
tailor-made instrument for the localization and disciplining of remaining net-
work-specific market power. The starting point for this disaggregated regulatory 
approach is to differentiate between those network areas in which functional  
(active and potential) competition is possible, and those network areas in which 
stable network-specific market power can be localized. 
 
The disaggregated regulation approach involves applying the essential facilities 
doctrine not only on a case-to-case basis, but to a category of cases, namely to 
monopolistic bottleneck facilities. The non-discriminatory conditions of access 
to the essential facilities must be set out in more detail as part of the disaggre-
gated regulatory approach. In doing so, the application of the essential facilities 
doctrine must be seen in a dynamic context. The aim must therefore also be to 
design the conditions of access so as not to hinder infrastructure competition, 
but instead create an incentive for research and development, innovations and 
investments at facility level. This is the only way to establish a balanced rela-
tionship between services and infrastructure competition.  
 
                                                 
14  This means that access to ports, airports or railway networks can neither be refused, 
nor granted under conditions that penalize competitors, without factual justification.   11  
4.    Network-specific market power on the clearing and settlement  
     markets? 
 
The reference to network economics is chosen in order to elaborate the potential 
for competition on the post-trade markets. This primarily involves a normative 
analysis, based on network economics, with the aim of localizing network-
specific stable market power and the ensuing regulatory problems. 
  
For this purpose, the following section will look at various network sectors. In 
particular, it becomes evident that absolutely no telecommunications services 
(both basic and value-added services) have the characteristics of a monopolistic 
bottleneck and, as a result, any form of market power regulation is completely 
amiss. In order to present the relevance of this case for the post-trade markets, it 
also becomes apparent that clearing and settlement can be interpreted as a par-
ticular form of value-added telecommunications service. This is because these 
services are based on a suitable combination of data transfer and processing. 
This implies that the markets for clearing and settlement can, in principle, be 
classified as competitive. This insight is corroborated using SWIFT (Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) as an example of potential 
service networks alternatives in the area of clearing and settlement. 
 
 
4.1   Competitive subparts and monopolistic bottlenecks in various network  
     sectors 
 
The sizes of the various monopolistic bottleneck areas vary considerably from 
network sector to network sector. The network areas are to be examined on a 
disaggregated basis in order to establish in which areas the criteria for a mo-
nopolistic bottleneck are actually fulfilled. The aim is also to avoid the danger of 
falsely identifying monopolistic bottlenecks. 
 
Network areas characterised by a combination of a natural monopoly and irre-
versible costs can be localised in different network sectors:
15 unlike airplanes, 
                                                 
15  For detailed case studies see Knieps, Brunekreeft (eds.), 2003.   12  
airport infrastructures involve irreversible costs. Investments in terminal build-
ings and runways, for example, cannot later be transferred elsewhere, as is pos-
sible with airplanes. Where carriers rely on a single airport in a particular region, 
the airport has the characteristics of a monopolistic bottleneck. Rail track infra-
structure is a monopolistic bottleneck system (unlike the actual transportation 
service and train traffic control) because the rail track operator in a given geo-
graphic area has a natural monopoly and there are irreversible costs when rail 
tracks are built.  
 
 
4.2    Competition on the markets for telecommunications services 
 
Telecommunications services can be differentiated into various basic services, 
such as telephone calls, fax, data transfer services, and value-added services. 
These value-added services are created by combining basic services and the ap-
propriate computer software, whereby the proportion of data transfer and data 
processing components can vary strongly depending on the type of value-added 
service. Examples of value-added services that consist mainly of pure data trans-
fer are e-mail or electronic data exchange. Examples of value-added services 
that consist mainly of data processing are information services of all kinds, in-
terbank clearing and broadband internet services.  
 
The market for telecommunications services continues to be characterized often 
by economies of scale and scope. Nonetheless, competition is a key feature of 
these telecommunications services networks. Free market entry means that inef-
ficient providers are replaced by more efficient ones. Even if the established 
company has a high market share, inefficient production or the provision of ser-
vices that are not market-oriented would very quickly result in the company suf-
fering considerable market share losses. This is because customers are not tied 
to any specific provider and can respond immediately to price decreases on the 
market. Regardless of whether or not basic or value-added services are involved, 
the criteria for a monopolistic bottleneck are not fulfilled. New market entrants 
in particular have the opportunity to position themselves against the established 
providers by means of technology and product differentiation. This means that   13  
in the case of telecommunications services, active network competition is typi-
cally characterized by network heterogeneity. 
 
The markets for services provided on the basis of telecommunications infra-
structures are currently dominated by intense innovation competition. This 
means that traditional value-added services are being increasingly replaced by 
Internet services and Internet Service Providers. As a general rule, a distinction 
must be made between the required network resources (transmission networks, 
intelligent circuit switching facilities, routers, etc.) on the one hand, and the re-
quired PC networking software (multimedia platform, browser, etc.) on the 
other. The network resources required for long-distance telecommunications do 
not represent bottleneck facilities. The establishment and provision of PC net-
working software is not considered a monopolistic bottleneck either, which 
means that there is no ensuing need for regulation, because standardized inter-
faces provide all PC networking programs (multimedia platform, browsers, etc.) 
with non-discriminatory access to telecommunications infrastructures.  
 
Unlike on the services markets, monopolistic bottlenecks cannot be ruled out at 
telecommunications infrastructure level at present. Sunk costs are only relevant 
in the area of cable-based telecommunications infrastructure. Since economies 
of scale are exhausted in long distance telecommunications networks, competi-
tion between active (and potential) firms will prevent the existence of market 
power. As a result, monopolistic bottlenecks are only relevant to the local loop. 
The increasing use of alternative network access technologies and the ensuing 
potential for competition are expected to lead to a successive phasing out of the 
bottleneck situation, even within local telecommunications infrastructure (e.g. 
Knieps, 1997, pp.331-333).  
 
 
4.3   Network economic characteristics of clearing and settlement as  
value-added telecommunications services 
 
The following section will illustrate that clearing and settlement has the same 
characteristics as value-added telecommunications services. Since telecommuni-
cations services, be it basic or value-added services, can not be classified as mo-  14  
nopolistic bottlenecks, clearing and settlement, as a result, do not fulfil the char-
acteristics of essential facilities and therefore should not be subjected to ex ante 
regulation. A market power situation, in the sense that clearing and settlement 
are infrastructures with the characteristics of essential facilities does not exist. 




4.3.1    Various value-added telecommunications services in the clearing  
and settlement sector 
 
Clearing and settlement services are a particular form of value-added telecom-
munications services, because they are based on suitable combinations of data 
transfer and processing. In principle, a distinction must be made between the 
paper side of the securities business, which involves transferring ownership of 
the securities, and the cash side of the securities business, which relates to the 
corresponding cash payment. In contrast to CCP, credit and liquidity risks do not 
occur. Nevertheless, operational risks within data transfer cannot be excluded. 
   
Since both the securities traded and the required monetary amounts are not nor-
mally transferred physically, but rather by corresponding rebookings, telecom-
munications services are involved in both the cash transactions and the securities 
transactions. Depending on whether clearing and settlement is performed within 
one bank, between banks, transaction banks, national or international “custo-
dian” banks or via specialized clearing houses, numerous different clearing and 
settlement services networks are employed.
16  These are often characterized by 
                                                 
16  A large number of banks and financial institutions are actively involved in interbank 
trading (OTC). In Germany, one example of a transaction bank is dwpbank, the 
shareholders of which are DZ Bank Frankfurt, WGZ-Bank Düsseldorf, Westfälisch-
Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband Münster and Rheinische Sparkassen- und 
Giroverband Düsseldorf. Examples of end custodians (CSDs) are: Clearstream Bank-
ing Frankfurt (Germany), Euroclear France (France), Österreichische Kontrollbank 
(Austria), etc. There are currently two International Central Securities Depositories 
(ICSDs) in Europe: Clearstream Banking in Luxembourg and Euroclear in Brussels. 
Both are active in the cross-border securities business. Global financial services pro-
viders also offer securities settlement services. These are classified as global custodi-
ans or sub-custodians depending on whether or not the markets served are cross-
border markets or national markets.   15  
the establishment and operation of various types of hardware (terminals), soft-
ware and appropriately trained employees. Furthermore, given that clearing and 
settlement involves not only data transfer via telecommunications networks 
(leased lines, Internet, etc.) but also always involves data processing, the clear-
ing and settlement process involves bundled network services and, as a result, 
value-added telecommunications services.  
 
Various different communication methods are available for clearing and settle-
ment, applying electronic data exchange using standardized data formats. Stan-
dardized data formats enable clients to feed order data automatically directly 
from their in-house system, dispensing with the need to capture data twice. The 
required clearing and settlement functions are executed by various different 
market participants.
 Developments in information technologies are making fun-
damental changes in the potential for shaping the securities trading value chain. 
One fundamental characteristic is an increasing standardization and automation 
of the various phases of securities settlement. A key example of this is the trend 
away from floor based trading towards partially or fully-automated trading plat-
forms. As a result, there is a growing incentive to harmonize the trading level of 
the value chain as well as the clearing and settlement level of the value chain. 
The potential for the implementation of global straight through processing is al-
ready being discussed in the literature. (cf. e.g. Weitzel et al., 2003, p. 409).
17 
Advances in information and communications technology are creating potential 
for the standardization and automation of clearing and settlement processes that 




4.3.2    Potential service network alternatives using the SWIFT example 
 
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) is an 
interesting example of a potential service network alternative for clearing and 
settlement. SWIFT was formed by banks as a joint venture in 1973 with the aim 
                                                 
17  Straight trough processing  is the end-to-end automation of the entire value-added 
process from the initiation of trading to settlement with no requirement for manual 
intervention.   16  
of facilitating interbank trading. SWIFT then witnessed a period of rapid growth 
resulting from the network effects of a common communication standard and an 
ensuing reduction in transaction and control costs. It does not, however, fulfil 
the conditions of an essential facility in any way as a result. Instead, SWIFT is a 
typical example of a high-quality service network based on common communi-
cation standards and electronic data processing systems. Traditionally, SWIFT 
services have been limited to the data transfer required for the monetary side of 
the securities business. The banks involved are responsible for executing the or-
ders themselves. 
 
There are different ways of establishing innovative value-added data transfer 
and processing services. In particular, the market has openings for competing 
value-added services, which means that there is no long-term cost asymmetry 
between established SWIFT network providers and possible alternative value-
added service providers. A high market share does not imply network-specific 
market power.
18 Additional competition potential also arises from the dynamic 
development of the SWIFT network based on the use of new communications 
protocols (IP protocol) and new communications software (XML). 
 
Whereas in the past, SWIFT specialized in providing a secure communications 
standard for the electronic exchange of standardized SWIFT messages (SWIFT 
MT messages), it is developing towards becoming a system for the generation of 
SWIFT ML messages.
19 The objective is to achieve a greater degree of interop-
erability with other systems traditionally used for electronic data exchange for a 
diverse range of financial products between banks, brokers and other capital 
market participants, in particular FIX ML.
20 The aim is to achieve cooperation 
                                                 
18  Rather, the “winner-takes-most market” principle applies due to the high fixed costs 
involved in software development, meaning that the active provider can only survive 
with a high market share. Nonetheless, competition exists due to the lack of long-
term cost asymmetries; this is corroborated by innovation competition on the dy-
namic markets over the course of time (cf. Economides, 2001). 
19  The integration of heterogeneous systems can now be performed using XML, an in-
terface language described as message-oriented middleware used to represent a cen-
tral data model (cf. Weitzel et al., 2003, p. 412.  
20  The FIX ML protocol is the advanced XML version of the existing FIX protocol, de-
veloped in 1994, a medium for electronic data exchange for a range of financial 
products between banks, brokers and other capital market participants.   17  
between, and integration of FIX ML and SWIFT ML in order to actively employ 
SWIFT in the post-trade phase, too.
21 The intention is therefore to use this coop-
eration to establish straight-through processing, i.e. end-to-end automation of the 
trading process. Given that SWIFT ML documents are ten times larger than the 
corresponding SWIFT MT messages, the use of XML-based systems at banks is 
still under development (cf. Weitzel et al., 2003). Due to the drastic decline in 
telecommunications transfer costs and the fact that the current SWIFT network 
uses the considerably more high-performance Internet protocol (IP) (compared 
with the traditional X 25 protocol), SWIFT ML is expected to offer competitive 
performance potential in the clearing and settlement market in the future. 
 
As a consequence, network-specific market power in the clearing and settlement 
markets cannot be localized. Rather, these markets are competitive, due, among 




5.    Technical regulatory functions on the post-trade markets 
 
In addition to the problem of disciplining network-specific market power, there 
are also questions concerning technical regulation on post-trade markets. Al-
though technical regulatory functions can also have implications for competition 
policy, they are fundamentally different from regulatory interventions to disci-
pline network-specific market power. As a first step in the analysis of this sub-
ject area, the layering scheme of the network economy is introduced. 
 
 
5.1   The layering scheme of the network economy 
 
From a network economic point of view, it seems useful to differentiate between 
the various network layers in order to localize network-specific market power 
and to separate these from the preceding area of technical regulatory functions: 
                                                 
21  Information on SWIFT can be found on the SWIFT homepage: http://www.swift.de  18  
Layer 1:  Network services (e.g. air traffic, telecommunications, gas and  
electricity transmission) 
Layer 2:  Infrastructure management (e.g. air traffic control, railway traffic 
control) 
Layer 3:  Network infrastructure (e.g. rail lines, airports, telecommunications 
networks and local phone networks) 
 
Technical regulatory functions (e.g. postal code system, telephone number ad-
ministration, land registry) precede the provision of network services and the 
construction of network infrastructures and can be relevant to each of layers 1 
through 3. They are a precondition for the construction and operation of net-
works and must therefore be provided without discrimination. Technical regula-
tory functions should in no way be confused with monopolistic bottlenecks, as 
only the latter are characterized as natural monopolies with irreversible costs.
 
Technical functions of coordination are of a different nature than problems aris-
ing from network-specific market power and should be dealt with separately. 
 
 
5.2   General distinction of technical regulatory functions from layers 1  
     through 3 
 
Technical regulatory functions can have relevance on the network layers 1 
through 3. For instance, it is necessary that the vehicles used for the provision of 
transportation services (layer 1) meet technical safety standards and are periodi-
cally monitored for compliance with these standards. Providers of telecommuni-
cations services must be technically able to conduct billing, for which access to 
source numbers and the relevant participant data (name, address) are required. 
The compulsory access to this data, however, should not extend to the much 
broader demand that the established provider grant access to its invoicing and 
collection systems for competitors. These constitute neither technical regulatory 
functions nor an essential facility. There are numerous sectors of the economy in 
which only minimal revenue is garnered from each customer in mass business 
and solutions are devised to contend with the problem of billing. For example, a   19  
cooperation between several telecommunications providers for the purpose of 
setting up a joint clearing centre for invoicing and collection would be conceiv-
able.  
 
The technical regulatory functions preceding the provision of network services 
(layer 1) can be distinguished from services on layer 1 in that they are always 
concerned with problems of coordination for an entire market rather than with 
the problems of a single provider. Technical regulatory functions are not con-
cerned with the logistical problems of a single provider or a fraction of provid-
ers, but with the coordination of all services offered within the entire relevant 
market. In this sense, code sharing, interlining and joint frequent flier programs 
in the air traffic sector do not constitute technical regulatory functions. 
  
Infrastructure management (layer 2) also requires as precondition a technical 
regulatory function. The definite geographical delineation of areas of responsi-
bility for rail and air traffic control, as well as the assignment of competence to 
the control agency for a specified period is a technical regulatory function. The 
actual implementation of these functions as part of infrastructure management, 
on the other hand, is relegated to layer 2 and can be periodically reassigned. 
 
Furthermore, some technical regulatory functions are complementary to layer 3. 
For instance, the building of network infrastructures, e.g. runways, rail lines or 
freeways requires planning procedures. The construction of mobile communica-
tions networks requires the assignment of the necessary frequencies. 
 
 
5.3   Disaggregated analysis of the notary function 
 
The requirement to register securities held under collective safe custody at a 
Wertpapiersammelbank is a specific characteristic of the German system, based 
on the statutory regulations of the German Safe Custody Act. At the time when 
the legislation was endorsed, lawmakers assumed that collective safe custody 
would be the exception among the various types of custody arrangements (e.g. 
individual jacket custody). But in practice, the development of securities trading   20  
has seen collective safe custody become the rule. Absent the statutory provisions 
set forth in section 1 sub-section 3 and section 5 sub-section 1 of the Safe Cus-
tody Act, there would be no Wertpapiersammelbank in Germany. Nonetheless, 
collective safe custody matches the real demands of a high quality securities 
business. For instance, the Wertpapiersammelbank as an institution is equivalent 
to the end custodian in an international context. This could be, e.g. a CSD, but 
could also be a Common or Specialized depository. In the area of Eurobonds, 
for example, the end custodian functions are performed by specialized banks 
called Common Depositories, which ensure access to International Central Secu-
rities Depositories (ICSDs).  
 
Precondition for competition on the markets for clearing and settlement is non-




5.3.1  Authenticity  
 
One technical regulatory function of the notary function performed by the end 
custodian is the documentation of the authenticity of individual securities (cer-
tificates) and total holdings. The authenticity function involves the documenta-
tion of total holdings and the changes resulting from capital increases or re-
demptions. The authenticity function is subject to increasing rationalization, in 
which the transition from individual certificates to global certificates is particu-
larly noteworthy. Experience from several countries shows that a complete ces-
sation of the use of certificates and a transition to dematerialized securities is 
possible. In Italy and France, for example, dematerialization is common. An ex-
ample for Germany is the public register for German Government Bonds (Regis-
ter für Bundesschulden bei der Bundeswertpapierverwaltung). 
 
 
5.3.2     Registry   
 
An end custodian must document (register) the current account balance of its 
institutional securities depositors in relation to the issuer. In Germany, for ex-
ample, the custodian banks as depositors with an end custodian must be finan-  21  
cial institutions subject to the statutory custody requirements. Therefore, an end 
custodian is in a position to compile the registry statement upon which all of the 
securities under custody on the accounts of its institutional securities depositors 
are apparent at any given point in time (record date registry). This allows up-to-
date determination and exercise of property rights by the custodian bank and the 
periodic distribution and forwarding of securities income to beneficial owners.
 
At its core, the registry function seems to be separable from the authenticity 
function. 
 
There are several possible ways to organize the distribution of securities income. 
For example, the issuer can engage an agent bank to execute the distributions 
based on the record date registry. Distributions via custodian banks would, how-
ever, also be feasible; or at any rate, distributions need not necessarily be per-
formed by the custody service of an end custodian, but could be executed di-
rectly, based on the account data provided by the end custodian. 
 
 
5.3.3  Links between competing end custodians 
 
At present, links already exist between individual end custodians in the various 
countries. These links, however, are characteristically complementary when it 
comes to the settlement of cross-border securities transactions. Still, the question 
of potential for competition between end custodians of securities held under col-
lective safe custody must be kept separate from this fact.  
 
If more than one end custodian is involved, access to the accounts of custodian 
banks i.e. corrections is only possible if the necessary links between the end cus-
todians are in place. It is not sufficient that custodian banks holding accounts 
with several end custodians confirm their own bilateral transactions. There is no 
need for the registry function to be exclusively assigned to a single end custo-
dian. In Germany, this is taken into account in the Safe Custody Act, which 
permits several end custodians. The registry function, in addition to the authen-
ticity function (certification of the assets under custody), also requires links be-
tween competing end custodians in order for the alignment of accounts to be 
possible in cases which involve more than one end custodian. These technical   22  
regulatory functions – summarized by the notary function - apply to all securi-
ties under collective safe custody.  
 
 
6.     Conclusions 
 
The analysis of this paper has shown that clearing and settlement have the char-
acteristics of value-added services in the area of telecommunications, and are 
consequently assignable to network layer 1. Thus, clearing and settlement do not 
represent monopolistic bottlenecks in need of regulation. The core argument is 
that although bundling advantages can occur in the provision of clearing and set-
tlement services, the building of networks to provide such value-added services 
in the area of telecommunications is not characterized by long-term cost-
asymmetry based on irreversible costs. 
 
Clearing and settlement markets are characterized by active and potential com-
petition. The potential for competition in the provision of clearing and settle-
ment services cannot be evaluated sufficiently using purely static estimates con-
cerning the efficiency with which bundling advantages are exploited. The diver-
sity of different competing clearing and settlement service providers with a vari-
ety of products also plays an important role. Sector-specific market power regu-
lation of clearing and settlement is not justified. 
 
Furthermore, it can be asserted that the authenticity and registry functions do not 
represent a monopolistic bottleneck. In particular, the provision of these services 
does not require irreversible costs. Moreover, the idea of competing end custo-
dians is entirely viable. The notary function for securities held in collective safe 
custody should rather be viewed as a technical regulatory function, similar to the 
access provided by the postal code system and address changes in the postal sec-
tor or the access to participant data in telecommunications. Non-discriminatory 
access to the technical regulatory functions should be obligatory. It appears to be 
necessary that the needs of all active and potential providers of clearing and set-
tlement services are equally taken into account in order to guarantee non-
discriminatory access to the notary function.   23  
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